Can the Allies strategic bombing campaigns of the Second World war be judged a success or failure?
Nick Dowling (Case)

Introduction 

            The strategic bombing of Germany was designed to permanently weaken Germany’s ability and desire to wage war. Strategic bombing is defined as “a strike at the enemy’s capacity and willingness to continue in the conflict”.[1] As such, it differs from tactical bombing which directly targets the enemy’s armed forces in the field.

The Casablanca directive of 1943 formally set out the objectives of the Allied strategic bombing campaign as “the progressive destruction of the German military, industrial, and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened”.[2] As well as these stated goals, the strategic bombing campaign also aimed to bolster British civilian morale by retaliating for the German ‘Blitz’ on British cities[3] and, after June 1941, to support the Soviet Union by diverting German resources away from the Eastern Front.[4] It was also hoped that via the destruction of their cities the German people would be made to see the cost of war, thereby preventing any future German aggression.[5] 

The Flawed RAF Campaign

The attacks made by the RAF in the early years of the war were largely ineffectual. The strategic bombing campaign got off to a very slow start as the RAF was initially only allowed to attack ‘pure’ military targets in an attempt to minimise German civilian casualties and thereby prevent German retaliations against British civilians.[6] This tactic was abandoned following the German terror bombing of Rotterdam in 1940, with the RAF widening its targets to include the night time ‘precision’ bombing of industrial targets.[7] However, this campaign ended in failure, with the damning Butt Report of August 1941 concluding that little damage was being inflicted on German industry as only a third of bombs were being dropped within five miles of their target.[8] This failure was especially severe as the RAF was the only means Britain had of directly attacking Germany and Bomber Command had paid a high price in aircrew and their aircraft in its attempt to strike back at the Germans.[9]

  The failure of the night precision bombing resulted in the RAF changing its tactics. From February 1942 onwards night bombing attacks were directed at German cities as a whole, and not just selected targets. This change was prompted by the Butt Report’s findings that further ‘precision’ attacks were pointless as “a city was the highest common factor which Bomber Command Crews could hit”.[10] In place of the high hopes once held for precision bombing, it was hoped that these ‘area’ bombing raids would weaken Germany’s ability to continue the war by lowering civilian morale and preventing civilians from reaching their jobs.[11] However, the area attacks inflicted only minor damage on German industry as while the RAF targeted the centre of the cities most German factories were actually located on the fringes of the major cities[12]. For example, following the fire bombing of Hamburg, which destroyed much of the city and killed tens of thousands of people, production returned to its pre raid level a  mere two months after the raid.[13]

  While the area bombing attacks were the best the RAF could do in 1941 they became more wasteful as technology advanced. By 1943 the RAF had developed sophisticated radio navigation aids that allowed highly accurate night time navigation and bombing. However, instead of using these aids to resume the night precision bombing campaign against German industry, the commander of the RAF’s Bomber Command, Arthur Harris, continued the unproductive and increasingly expensive area attacks in the mistaken belief that night precision bombing would still be no more effective then it had been in 1941.[14] This area bombing campaign reached its climax in the ‘Battle of Berlin’ fought during the winter of 1943-44 where the RAF lost over one thousand aircraft while inflicting only minor damage on Germany’s ability to wage war.[15] While this campaign was a disaster, Harris’s greatest mistake was to resume the area bombing campaign in July 1944. This is because Bomber Command had clearly demonstrated its ability to make precision raids at night against important targets by destroying much of the French and German rail system in the weeks prior to D-Day.[16] Whilst the RAF’s area bombing attacks became ever more successful in killing German civilians and destroying their homes, these attacks made only minor contribution to the decline of the German economy and military compared to the efforts of the USAAF’s precision bombing campaign.[17]

Enter the USAAF 

From the start of it’s bombing campaign in August 1942, the USAAF bombed by day in the hope of achieving greater accuracy then the RAF. Pre-war USAAF doctrine was based around the perceived ability of large and well armed bombers such as the B-17 Flying Fortress being able to successfully defend themselves whilst penetrating deep into enemy airspace and  delivering an accurate attack before fighting their way home.[18] However, when the bombers were sent over Europe “without fighter escort, the ‘self defending’ Flying Fortress formations were devastated by fighter attack”.[19]  These high losses forced the Americans to abandon deep penetrations of Germany until February 1944 when enough long range escort fighters were available to protect the bombers.[20]

Defeat in 1943 

It was only from mid 1943 that the Allies strategic bombing of Germany began to make an impact on German industry. Due to the small size of the USAAF and the RAF’s inability to directly attack German industry by night, “prior to the summer of 1943, air raids had no appreciable effect on German munitions production, or the national output in general”.[21] After the summer of 1943 the growing strength of the RAF and USAAF allowed the bombing campaign to be waged on a much greater scale and it began to show results. However, these results were very limited at first, and in 1943 only 9 percent of total German production was lost due to bombing, and by building new factories and increasing the output of undamaged factories the Germans were still able to meet their production targets.[22] This result was due to the RAF’s area bombing campaign continuing to only have a small impact on German industry[23] and the USAAF’s flawed target selection process which resulted in the USAAF suffering heavy losses sending unescorted bombers deep into Germany to attack targets of questionable strategic value. For example, the Americans primary targets in 1943 were aircraft and ball bearing factories. However these targets weren’t vulnerable to air attack and the bombing, which cost the USAAF hundreds of aircraft, achieved little.[24] Whilst pursuing this campaign, the Americans missed the opportunity to strike at more vulnerable sectors of the German war economy such as the refineries which produced aviation fuel, many of which were within the range of escort fighters.[25] Another of the major flaws in Allied tactics in 1943 was the failure to continue attacks against productive targets such as the German oil industry or the Rhur Dams. Had these targets been repeatedly attacked the Allies could have permanently shut down that sector of the German economy by preventing the Germans from repairing the damage and building new facilities.[26]   

Another reason for the poor results of the Allied attacks against German industry in 1943 were the counter measures taken by Germany. Under the leadership of Albert Speer, the Minister for Armaments, many of the important segments of German industry were dispersed into smaller factories which were less vulnerable to the RAF’s area bombing, and did not present large targets for the USAAF’s precision bombing.[27] Whilst these dispersals reduced the efficiency of German industry, they limited the damage caused by bombing by robbing “the enemy air forces of much of their target system”.[28] Speer also proved to be  highly skilled at repairing damaged facilities and increasing production in the economy as a whole, and under his leadership German armaments production defied the Allied bombers by tripling between January 1942 and July 1944.[29] The German military also can take much of the credit for blunting the bomber attacks. As well as defeating the unescorted American bombers in 1943,[30] the German Air Force (the Luftwaffe) was also successful in inflicting heavy casualties upon the RAF night bombers. Whilst the Luftwaffe had trouble intercepting bombers at night in the early years of the war, from 1942 it enjoyed greater success by improving its interception tactics, building more and better equipped night fighters and deploying more radar stations and flak batteries.[31] While the RAF would try to counter the German defences through the use of technical devices such as radar jamming, German night fighters continued to take a heavy toll of the RAF bombers until the final months of the war, when shortages of fuel and the capture of their ground control stations finally defeated them.[32]  

Despite the Germans success at countering the Allied bombers, this diversion of German effort was, paradoxically, one of the major successes of the Allied strategic bombing campaign. The German efforts to counter the Allied attacks were huge and required the services of tens of thousands of workers and a large proportion of German industrial output to build and maintain defences such as flak batteries and bomb shelters, and to repair the damage caused by the Allied bombers. By 1944 4.5 million German soldiers and civilians, representing 20% of the German labour force, were employed in combating the bombers. This greatly limited the manpower pool available to work in armaments factories, and therefore limited the scale of the increase in armaments output.[33] The desire to retaliate against Britain also wasted German industrial resources, with the V1 and V2 rocket programs using significant resources for meagre returns.[34] So great was the total diversion of German resources required to counter the bombers, that Albert Speer believed that it in effect “opened a second front long before the invasion of Europe”, and represented a major Allied victory.[35]  

Victory in 1944? 

By correcting the mistakes of 1943, the Allied air forces enjoyed greater success in 1944. When the Americans resumed their penetrations of Germany in February, the now escorted bombers managed to destroy a remarkable 90% of total German aircraft production that month.[36] However, from April the strategic bombing campaign against German industry was disrupted by the need to use the heavy bombers to attack tactical targets in preparation for the invasion of Normandy.

When the strategic bombing campaign was resumed in July 1944 the Allies began for the first time to reduce total German industrial output,[37] with 17 percent of German production being destroyed in the course of the year, resulting in total production falling short of its goals, and total armaments output contracting on the levels achieved in 1943.[38] These improved results were the result of the Allies newly won air supremacy over Europe allowing for more effective bombing with lower losses of aircraft, and an improvement in the Allies selection of targets. In particular, the attacks launched after D-Day against the German rail network and synthetic oil refineries were highly successful.[39] Attacks made by both the Allied air forces on the German railway system destroyed approximately two thirds of German rolling stock.[40] The difficulties this caused in moving finished goods and raw materials made the attack on the railroads “the most important single cause of Germany’s ultimate economic collapse”.[41] The attacks made on the German synthetic oil industry were also highly effective as “between March and September [monthly] oil production declined from 316,000 to 17,000 tons”.[42] The resulting shortages of oil related raw materials crippled the German economy and greatly reduced armaments output.[43] These campaigns owe a lot of their success to the Allies mounting repeated raids against the selected targets, thereby frustrating German attempts to repair them, and show that the Allies learned from the failures of their 1943 campaign.[44]

The German Military Under Assault

          Militarily, the most important result of the Allies bombing campaign was the destruction of the Luftwaffe. This was mainly achieved by the USAAF, which by mounting large raids on vital sectors of German industry, “forced the Luftwaffe to fight”.[45] Whilst this tactic ended in defeat for the USAAF in 1943, in 1944 the bombers were heavily escorted by excellent fighters such as the P-51 Mustang, and in the resulting air battles the Luftwaffe’s fighter force lost 13,000 pilots and 37,000 fighters.[46] These losses were so great that they shattered the Luftwaffe’s fighter force “to the point where … [it was] no longer a serious factor in the air war”.[47] By giving the Western Allies and the Soviet Union air superiority  over Europe this victory greatly eased the task of defeating Germany with ground forces. [48] For example, in June 1944 the USAAF and RAF flew 163,000 sorties over Europe (mainly in support of the Normandy invasion).  In contrast the Luftwaffe squadrons in Western Europe flew only 13,000 sorties, and in doing so lost 1500 aircraft.[49] In the same month, the Soviets enjoyed a 6 to 1 superiority in aircraft on the Eastern Front, and this superiority was a major factor in the Red Armies destruction of the German Army Group Centre in late June.[50] In addition to the losses of fighters incurred by fighting the bombers and their escorts, the Luftwaffe’s bomber forces took crippling losses making retaliation attacks against Britain such as the ‘Baby Blitz’ of London in early 1944. [51]

          The Allies bombing also greatly effected the German Army (the Wehrmacht). This is because the Wehrmacht’s defensive efforts were greatly hindered by the massive diversion of weapons to the home front at a time when they were needed to counter the advancing Soviet Army. For example, the need to defend Germany forced huge numbers of anti-aircraft guns to be deployed around German cities. Had these guns instead been deployed in an anti-tank role on the Eastern Front this would have doubled the Wehrmacht’s anti-tank capability and potentially have given the German’s the ability to make up for the Soviet’s superior rate of tank construction.[52] The strategic bombing attacks against German fuel and transportation installations also crippled the Wehrmacht by robbing it of much of its ability to manoeuvre and supply its troops and this greatly limited its ability to fight the advancing Allied and Soviet Armies.[53] However, despite these Allied successes, the German army never lacked infantry weapons, tanks and ammunition until the last six months of the war.[54]

          The Allies bombing campaign had varied effects on the German Navy (the Keigsmarine). During the early phases of the strategic bombing campaign the Allies made German shipyards high priority targets, [55] and this resulted in the destruction of numerous submarines and warships as they were being built or repaired. On the other hand, the Allies decision to use their bombers to attack Germany greatly limited the number of aircraft available for anti submarine warfare, a task for which the large and long ranged aircraft were highly suited.[56] However, despite the shortage of bombers, the Allied air forces and navies still proved to be too strong for the Keigsmarine, which was defeated in mid 1943, just as the strategic bombing campaign was seriously getting under way.[57] Following this defeat strategic bombing played an important role in preventing the resurrection of the German submarine fleet in 1944 and 1945 by destroying one third of the advanced submarines being produced for the Keigsmarine as they were being built.[58]

Effects on German Morale

          Whilst German morale suffered under the Allied air attacks, it never broke because of them. The RAF’s area raids, which were primarily aimed at civilian morale, were successful  in killing and ‘dehousing’ German civilians, with 592,000 German civilians killed and 3.37 million homes destroyed by Allied (mainly British) bombing throughout the war.[59] However, whilst “it was a terrible experience to be bombed, … German morale never came near to collapse until the very end [of the war]”, [60] when allied troops entered Germany.  However, the raids did lead to “a loss of sympathy and support for the [Nazi] regime”[61] and this influenced the German government’s decision not to mobilise the country for total war.[62] However, the net effect of this is questionable as there is evidence that air raids actually motivated German workers and Albert Speer credited an increase in worker morale as one of the reasons German industry was able to increase production despite the bombing.[63] Because of this effect, it is clear that the RAF’s area bombing attacks failed to achieve their main objecting of decreasing the Germans’ will and ability to wage war.[64]

Conclusion – Was the Campaign worth the cost?

          Despite the successes of the strategic bombing campaign against Germany, bombing did not defeat Germany by itself. This is because strategic bombing was only truly effective in speeding the end of the war when it was integrated and connected to the efforts of ground forces.[65] While the American victory over the Luftwaffe in 1944 was an important factor in allowing the Allied invasion of France, the Soviet Military did far more to weaken Germany prior to D-Day then strategic bombing.[66] It is also significant that “the campaigns which carried the promise of decisive results began after D-Day”,[67] meaning that as “the peak of the bombers success coincided with the defeat of the Wehrmacht in the field and the progressive occupation of Reich territory by the Allied Armies, the claims of the strategic bombing advocates that they possessed the secret of victory have not, and can never be proved”.[68]

          The Allies paid a high price, both in terms of money and lives for their strategic bombing offensive. The bombing campaign against Germany cost the RAF 75,000 casualties and the USAAF 43,742 casualties. [69] In addition, the bombing campaign cost the Allies 40,000 planes destroyed or damaged.[70] In economic terms, the British bomber offensive against Germany required 7% of total British manpower and up to a third of British industry to build, crew and maintain the bombers.[71] This had a major effect on the British war effort as a whole, with the resulting shortage of industrial capacity forcing Britain to buy most of its transport aircraft, landing craft, tanks and ammunition off the United States.[72] The American bombing campaign was also expensive, and “cost $27.5 billion, about 11 percent of the total [American] cost of the war”.[73] So great was the cost of the campaign to the Allies that the costs they incurred in bombing Germany may have actually been greater then the damage they inflicted upon the Germans.[74] However, this is of questionable importance as the Allies (and especially the USA) could sustain a much higher attrition rate then Germany could.[75]

           The Allies strategic bombing campaign was a qualified success. The campaign against Germany accelerated the destruction of the German military, with the Luftwaffe being destroyed by it and the German Army and Navy greatly suffering from the  limitations placed upon them by the air raids. Whilst strategic bombing failed to make a significant economic impact on the Germany throughout most of the war, it was unquestionably an important factor in Germany’s economic collapse in the last 12 months of the war. However, as the Allies payed a very high price for these limited successes, the strategic bombing campaign cannot be considered anything more then a marginal Allied victory.

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